### 2AC T USAF--- LONG VERSION

#### We meet: plan says “nuclear armed forces”--- that’s T

Quester 2006 (George H. Quester, Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University's Elliott School of Government, “Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo,” gbooks)

Weapons systems of various sorts are proliferating worldwide, and much may depend on what kinds of systems, offensive or defensive, have already been deployed by the time nuclear weapons have been used. A great number of relevant possibilities have to be introduced here. By the time of a such a nuclear escalation, the United States may already have effective missile defenses and resuscitated air defenses, or it may not, despite vast expenditures on such systems; and there may or may not have been a widespread proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in the world.¶ As in all the wars and war plans of the past, much will depend on what kinds of targets are hit. Nuclear weapons are most often thought of as a “countervalue” weapon ¶ , capable of destroying entire cities, as at Hiroshima and Nagasaki; but contingencies have existed, ever since the onset of the Cold War, for much more strictly countermilitary or counterforce uses of nuclear weapons. Again, there may be a great variation in the results achieved such a more specific attack. If important military goals were achieved in the escalation, very different responses might emerge than if the nuclear escalation proved relatively fruitless. Who the actor is would play a critical role in the perception of the event. The next power to use a nuclear weapon in combat could be a state hostile to the United States; to the extent that Americans have been thinking about this problem at all, this is the scenario that naturally captures most attention. But the user could instead be a power which is neither hostile nor friendly to the United States, the use being part of a conflict in which it would be difficult for Americans to identify with either side. The nuclear escalator might even be an ally of the United States. Finally, as noted, the scenarios for the next use of nuclear weapons must also include those involving such action by United States armed forces.

#### Counter interp: USAF are the four branches

DOD Dictionary No Date http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod\_dictionary/data/a/2554.html

United States Armed Forces

 (DOD) Used to denote collectively the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. See also Armed Forces of the United States.

#### We’re the Air Force

OV 2010 (Opposing Viewpoints, “The U.S. Armed Forces,” Gale Group)

The United States Armed Forces are the military forces that serve the United States of America. The U.S. Armed Forces include five service branches: the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. On 14 June 1775, the Continental Congress created the Continental Army, and also authorized riflemen from Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. By 13 October of that year, Congress had established a Naval Committee and authorized two armed ships to capture British vessels traveling to North America. On 10 November 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the creation of the Continental Marines. For these reasons, today's U.S. Armed Forces consider 1775 to be the year the U.S. military was formed.¶ While the United States has had a military since the 1700s, the National Security Act of 1947 established the modern U.S. Armed Forces. The National Security Act of 1947 created the United States Air Force and the current structure of the U.S. Armed Forces. The act also created the Department of Defense out of what had previously been the War Department. Since the 1940s, the U.S. Armed Forces have grown rapidly. As of 31 July 2010, there were 1,478,160 personnel on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces.¶ Structure and Function¶ The function of the U.S. Armed Forces is to help protect and defend the United States, its people, and its interests. In order to complete these functions, the U.S. Armed Forces operate on a strict chain of command, which allows for discipline, order, and the effective discharge of duties. The president of the United States is the official commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. However, carrying out the policies of the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy is overseen by the Department of Defense, a federal department. The Department of Homeland Security oversees the Coast Guard during peacetime, while the Coast Guard reports to the Department of Defense through the Navy in times of war.¶ The highest ranking members of the service branches include: the Army Chief of Staff, a four-star general; the Air Force Chief of Staff, a four-star general; the Chief of Naval Operations, an admiral; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, a four-star general. These officers are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a group of military leaders whose job it is to advise the president. The Coast Guard Commandant commands the Coast Guard, and is not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¶ In addition to active-duty members of the five service branches, the U.S. military has reserve military service members who serve in the National Guard or the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine reserves. These reserves undergo military training and must agree to a certain time commitment to the reserves. They may be called into active duty during times of war. The National Guard is a joint component of the Air Force and the Army. National Guard units are attached to each of the fifty states. The total number of U.S. military reservists is about 1.5 million.¶ U.S. Armed Forces Service Branches¶ While the overall aim of the U.S. Armed Forces is to protect the United States and its people, each of the service branches has a specific role. The role of the U.S. Army, for example, is to defend and protect the United States as well as its interests through use of ground troops, tactical nuclear weapons, tanks, artillery, and helicopters. As of 31 July 2010, there were 567,167 personnel in the U.S. Army.¶ The Air Force defends and protects the United States and any U.S. interests in space and air, often using tanker aircraft, bomber aircraft, transport aircraft, and helicopters. The U.S. Air Force is in charge of the nuclear ballistic missiles and military satellites, as well. As of 31 July 2010, there were 336,031 personnel in the U.S. Air Force.

#### Prefer our interp---

#### Best limit--- infinite small “troops” affs--- peacekeeping, SEAL teams, Jason Bourne affs--- only NUCLEAR weapons require special AUTHORITY to use--- no link to the limits DA

#### DOD definitions key to precision and predictable limits

DOD Dictionary 2010 (http://ra.defense.gov/documents/rtm/jp1\_02.pdf)

1. Scope ¶ The Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated ¶ Terms sets forth standard US military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of ¶ the Armed Forces of the United States. These military and associated terms, together with their ¶ definitions, constitute approved Department of Defense (DOD) terminology for general use by all ¶ DOD components. ¶ 2. Purpose ¶ This publication supplements standard English-language dictionaries and standardizes military ¶ and associated terminology to improve communication and mutual understanding within DOD, with ¶ other federal agencies, and among the United States and its allies. ¶ 3. Application ¶ This publication applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, the Joint Staff, ¶ combatant commands, DOD agencies, and all other DOD components. It is the primary terminology source when preparing correspondence, to include policy, strategy, doctrine, and planning documents. Criteria for inclusion of terminology in JP 1-02 is enumerated in Department ¶ of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5025.12, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology, ¶ and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5705.01, Standardization of Military ¶ and Associated Terminology.

#### They overlimit--- Neg definition is obsolete--- Outweighs Congressional intent

Dahinden 2011 (Erwin Dahinden,Director, International Relations, Swiss Armed Forces “Impact on military strategy, capability development and doctrine,” p. 67)

2. Technology and military capability¶ Available technologies have always been used by the military to improve ¶ the performance of existing weapon components (superiority versus ¶ denial). Any technological advance has triggered efforts to deny military ¶ advantages. This technological arms race has been a continuous process ¶ since the beginning of civilization11¶ .¶ The potential of new technologies has seldom been identified from the ¶ beginning: e.g. tanks were used in ww i to enforce infantry, and aircraft ¶ was deployed to gather intelligence and support artillery. It was the Italian¶ General Giulio Douhet who transposed concepts of naval warfare to the air ¶ and in his work Domination of the Air of 1921 developed the role of the air ¶ force in claiming “to have command of the air is to have victory”. In ww ¶ ii, General Guderian used the speed and weaponry of tanks and aircraft to ¶ launch deep strikes and to develop them as independent branches (concept ¶ of tanks as shields and aircraft as swords).¶ Technology and sophisticated weaponry alone do not guarantee military ¶ success. Other key factors that must be present are leadership (General ¶ Patton), skills, resilience and logistics.¶ The motivation to replace soldiers by technology is understandable ¶ because of overall costs, vulnerability and political implications. Battle ¶ experience repeatedly corrected this aspiration, e.g. in the 2006 Lebanon ¶ war, where failures were provoked by the overestimation of technical ¶ intelligence and the lack of humint. The concept of relying mainly on air ¶ forces and Special Forces for intervention, the so-called Rumsfeld Doctrine, ¶ failed to meet expectations in enduring freedom in Afghanistan.¶ The technological sophistication of military means is also an important ¶ element that enhances the morale and self-control of a soldier. The more ¶ confidence soldiers have in the effectiveness of their kits, the better ¶ their discipline and, as a consequence, their observance of the Rules of ¶ Engagement (roe).¶ 3. New capabilities and force structure¶ “Revolution in Military Affairs” (rma) became a catchword at ¶ the end of the 20th century. The term was originally coined by the ¶ Soviet military establishment and subsequently adopted by Israel and ¶ the United States12. In essence, rma gave soldiers more information ¶ about battle space, more precise data on potential targets and ensured ¶ better concentration of fire power in time and space (see graph). These ¶ improved capabilities are often summarised with the term “network ¶ enabled operations” (neo).¶ neo was first tested on a larger scale in the 1st Gulf War with impressive ¶ results. neo requires optimum integration of the various systems and ¶ becomes what is called the “system of the systems”. This had important ¶ consequences on force planning, interoperability, upgrading and long-term ¶ financial obligations.¶ New technologies have fundamentally changed the planning process of ¶ armed forces, made the procurement process more challenging and extended ¶ the long-term consequences for budgeting. Given the complex and rapidly ¶ evolving nature of military technologies, maintenance and logistic support ¶ of armed forces are changing substantially: upgrades have to be realised in ¶ harmony with other users requiring international synchronisation too. Repair ¶ consists mostly of exchanging components and it is necessary to engage ¶ more civilian capabilities in the rear area or in operational logistics13¶ .¶ Procurement was always a long-term exercise from the definition of ¶ requirements to the development of prototypes, testing and finally fielding ¶ with training. This took 10-15 years plus 20-30 years of operational ¶ use. The military call this “long-term life cycle management”. As the ¶ following graphical representation illustrates, the main costs encompass ¶ not only the actual procurement costs of a new weapon system, but have ¶ to include those occurring during its operationalisation, maintenance, and ¶ upgrading. These important long-term investments demand that the legal ¶ and budgetary framework for armed forces is highly predictable.¶ 4. Doctrine¶ Forces have to be designed and trained for fundamentally different types ¶ of operations. This requires flexibility in their structure, their command ¶ and control and their training.¶ In this environment the political and military control of the use of force ¶ and escalation becomes critical and necessitates new instruments. The ¶ development of rules of engagement14 for the specific mission should be ¶ seen against this background.

#### Nukes topic education outweighs--- 1AC Willis ev says “bomb power” is the root of ALL OTHER executive war powers--- prerequisite to learning about the other areas of the topic

#### Prefer reasonability--- competing interps causes race to the bottom--- AND it’s written into the rez

CC 12 (October 26, 2012, “Special Programs - Centenary College Wiki,” wiki.centenarycollege.edu/index.php/Special\_Programs‎)

An “area of study” is defined as a field of study or a related cluster within one of the College's academic departments.

### Legitimacy

#### Violence is decreasing due to hegemony- DA to the alt

Drezner 2005 Daniel W. Drezner Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University May 25, 2005 “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation” http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html

The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window.

#### “Structural violence” is reductive and inevitable

Boulding 1977 (Kenneth E. Boulding, economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, JSTOR)

Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive peace'. They are metaphors rather than models, and for that very reason are suspect. Metaphors always imply models and meta- phors have much more persuasive power than models do, for models tend to be the preserve of the specialist. But when a metaphor implies a bad model it can be very dangerous, for it is both persuasive and wrong. The metaphor of structural violence I would argue falls right into this category. The metaphor is that poverty, deprivation, ill health, low expectations of life, a condi- tion in which more than half the human race lives, is 'like' a thug beating up the victim and 'taking his money away from him in the street, or it is 'like' a conqueror stealing the land of the people and reducing them to slavery. The implication is that poverty and its associated ills are the fault of the thug or the conqueror and the solution is to do away with thugs and conquerors. While there is some truth in the metaphor, in the modern world at least there is not very much. Violence, whether of the streets and the home, or of the guerilla, of the police, or of the armed forces, is a very different phenomenon from poverty. The processes which create and sustain poverty are not at all like the processes which create and sustain violence, although like everything else in 'the world, everything is somewhat related to every- thing else.¶ There is a very real problem of the struc- tures which lead to violence, but unfortunately Galitung's metaphor of structural violence as he has used it has diverted atten- tion from this problem. Violence in the behavioral sense, that is, somebody actually doing damage to somebody else and trying to make them worse off, is a 'threshold' phenomenon, rather like the boiling over of a pot. The temperature under a pot can rise for a long time without its boiling over, but at some 'threshold boiling over will take place. The study of the structures which underlie violence are a very important and much neglected part of peace research and indeed of social science in general. Thresh- old phenomena like violence are difficult to study because they represent 'breaks' in the system rather than uniformities. Violence, whether between persons or organizations, occurs when the 'strain' on a system is too great for its 'strength'. The metaphor here is that violence is like what happens when we break a piece of chalk. Strength and strain, however, especially in social systems, are so interwoven historically that it is very difficult to separate them.¶ The diminution of violence involves two¶ possible strategies, or a mixture of the two;¶ one is the increase in the strength of the sys-¶ tem, 'the other is the diminution of the strain.¶ The strength of systems involves habit, culture, taboos, and sanctions, all these 'things which enable a system to stand increasing¶ strain without breaking down into violence. The strains on the system 'are largely dy- namic in character, such as arms races, mu- tually stimulated hostility, changes in rela- tive economic position or political power, which are often hard to identify. Conflicts of interest 'are only part 'of the strain on a sys-¶ tem, and not always the most important part. It is very hard for people ito know their interests, and misperceptions of 'interest take place mainly through the dynamic processes, not through the structural ones. It is only perceptions of interest which affect people's behavior, not the 'real' interests, whatever these may be, and the gap between perception and reality can be very large and re- sistant to change.¶ However, what Galitung calls structural violence (which has been defined 'byone un- kind commenltatoras anything that Galitung doesn't like) was originally defined as any unnecessarily low expectation of life, on that assumption that anybody who dies before the allotted span has been killed, however unintentionally and unknowingly, by some- body else. The concept has been expanded to include all 'theproblems of poverty, desti- tution, deprivation, and misery. These are enormouslyreal and are a very high priority for research and action, but they belong to systems which are only peripherally related to 'the structures whi'ch produce violence. This is not rto say that the cultures of vio- lence and the cultures of poverty are not sometimes related, though not all poverty cultures are cultures of violence, and cer- tainly not all cultures of violence are pover- ty cultures. But the dynamicslof poverty and the success or failure to rise out of it are of a complexity far beyond anything which the metaphor of structural violence can offer. While the metaphor of structural violence performed a service in calling attention to a problem, it may have done a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.

#### Subjective violence outweighs

Linden 2012 (Harry van der Linden, Professor of Philosophy at Butler University and Editor of the Radical Philosophy Review, “On the Violence of Systemic Violence: A Critique of Slavoj Žižek,” Radical Philosophy Review, Volume 15, number 1)

The “force” at the endpoint of the process of subjective violence, however, stays in place ¶ whether the violence is technologically mediated or not, and this force leads to a much more ¶ narrow range of harms inflicted by subjective violence than is caused by systemic violence. The ¶ harms of subjective violence are death, bodily harms, and acute psychological malfunctioning ¶ caused by “force,” while social injustice or systemic violence leads to such a wide variety of ¶ harms as social and political exclusion, inadequate intellectual development due to insufficient ¶ educational opportunities, harsh working conditions, subsistent wages, lack of free time and ¶ recreational opportunities, inadequate housing or no housing at all, lack of basic medical care, ¶ hunger, and inadequate access to clean water. We have noted that the degree of permitted ¶ counter-violence should vary with the seriousness of the violent threat and the culpability of the ¶ perpetrator, and that from this perspective much counter-violence in our society is ¶ disproportionate or excessive. Some of the harms of systemic violence (e.g., restricted ¶ educational opportunities) are such that revolutionary violence as counter-violence would be ¶ disproportionate, especially since revolutionary violence may easily escalate and inevitably ¶ include seriously harming people with limited moral responsibility. Other harms caused by ¶ poor institutions, though, such as serious illness, starvation, or a much-reduced lifespan, are ¶ such that they meet the bar set by proportionality. What should be taken into account in making such proportionality judgments is that ¶ subjective violence tends to have a different psychological impact on its victims than systemic ¶ violence, even when their respective harms are otherwise equally bad or even similar in kind. ¶ Only subjective violence tends to come suddenly to its victims, often leaving them in fear, ¶ shock, paralysis, and helplessness. What adds to their trauma is the very realization that ¶ another human being is intent on physically harming or killing them, disrupting the everyday ¶ trust in minimal human decency and cooperation. So, for example, even a preventable ¶ industrial accident that occurs due to infrequent safety inspections as an instance of systemic ¶ violence will have a different psychological impact on a mining community than a brutal attack ¶ by the mine owner’s private army against a peaceful protest of his workers in support of greater ¶ mine safety. Much systemic violence can be integrated into everyday life, but the same is much ¶ more difficult to do with regard to most subjective violence. It is this very fact that makes ¶ oppressive political violence so often effective in the short run. But, again, the differences here ¶ between subjective and systemic violence are less pronounced when subjective violence ¶ becomes impersonally or “bureaucratically” executed, as, for example, in penal violence (what ¶ happens during an execution provides a good illustration) and strategic bombing (assuming ¶ that the bombing campaigns remain limited in scope and frequency). ¶ This brings me to the most crucial distinction – for my purpose here – between systemic ¶ and subjective violence: the range of options available to the victims in addressing the former ¶ are much greater than for the latter. Once the clubs come down or the bullets fly in political ¶ protest, the choice is to flee and capitulate, fight back, or hope that nonviolent sacrifice will ¶ cease the violence. Similarly, once a war of aggression is under way the basic choice is to fight ¶ back or surrender and then hope that a massacre will not follow. Surrender does not preclude ¶ nonviolent resistance to the aggressor, but it means at least that the aggressor has been initially ¶ successful in imposing his political will. In cases of political violence, the intention of the ¶ perpetrator is typically to impose his political will, restricting the options of the victims by ¶ making resistance to this will very costly. Personal violence might not have such coercive intent, ¶ but similar limited action options are in place. Basically, once an individual attacks you ¶ personally, the choice is to fight back or hope that the cheek is not hit too hard when it isturned. In my view, fighting back, or counter-violence, is a prima facie right, but to make its ¶ actual execution morally right presumes that other moral standards are satisfied, such as ¶ proportionality in the case of individual counter-violence and jus ad bellum and jus in bello¶ standards (or approximations thereof) in the case of collective violence. The mere fact of ¶ systemic violence, to the contrary, does not warrant counter-violence; for social injustice can be ¶ effectively addressed in many different ways, including through institutional reforms from ¶ within, nonviolent protests, boycotts, collective strikes, lobbying, and electoral action. Even ¶ when social injustice can only be addressed through revolutionary change, counter-violence is ¶ not prima-facie warranted because it might be disproportionate. More importantly, it might not ¶ be necessary because it has become abundantly clear during the past few decades that ¶ nonviolence strategies can be remarkably successful in overthrowing oppressive regimes and ¶ the recent emergence of the global public sphere will only increase the chance of success of ¶ future endeavors. However, once the struggle for social justice is met by widespread violence ¶ inflicted, or supported, by the state, revolutionary counter-violence is prima facie morally right. ¶ Broadly speaking, the ethics of self-defense retains its moral force in light of the fact that ¶ nonviolence has not proven to be effective against agents who have no qualms unleashing ¶ subjective violence. No doubt, these are all difficult moral issues that should be carefully ¶ discussed and placed within their historical context. But all too often this does not happen in ¶ Žižek’s work, especially in Violence, and what we find instead is the claim that systemic violence ¶ rightfully begets subjective violence because it projects violence. This claim has only a ring of ¶ plausibility when we neglect that the two types of violence in this equation create very different ¶ ranges of options for remedial action. A more critical use of the concept of violence would not ¶ enable him to offer such a broad and facile justification of revolutionary violence.¶ To avoid misunderstanding, I am not claiming that the notion of systemic violence ¶ necessarily leads to a broad and superficial justification of revolutionary violence. Galtung, for ¶ example, does not make such an inference. However, one must then ask why the inference is ¶ not appropriate since it is commonly accepted that counter-violence against wrongful violence ¶ is justified. This means that one must show how systemic violence differs from subjective ¶ violence so that counter-violence is generally only prima facie just with regard to the latter. I suspect that once such differences are articulated (as I have tried to do in this paper) the notion ¶ of systemic violence loses much of its credibility. At any rate, the proponent of the notion of ¶ systemic violence should at least caution or clarify that our typical emotive and moral responses ¶ to subjective violence might not apply to systemic violence. The proponent also should outline ¶ some convincing limits on extending the core concept of violence because without such limits, ¶ as will become clear in the next section, we might end up with more conceptual and practical ¶ confusion and questionable support of revolutionary violence.

#### Democratic checks prevent their impact from escalating

O’Kane 1997 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

#### No mindless intervention

Mandelbaum 2011 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011)

I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

### CTS

#### Jackson and critical terror studies are wrong – no evidence to substantiate their claims and no viable alternative

Jones and Smith, 9 - \* University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND \*\* King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,“We're All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 **–** 302**,** Taylor and Francis)

The journal, in other words, is not intended, as one might assume, to evaluate critically those state or non-state actors that might have recourse to terrorism as a strategy. Instead, the journal's ambition is to deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word “terror,” its manipulation by ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity of “orthodox” terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise. Exposing the deficiencies in any field of study is, of course, a legitimate scholarly exercise, but what the symposium introducing the new volume announces questions both the research agenda and academic integrity of journals like *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and those who contribute to them. Do these claims, one might wonder, have any substance?

Significantly, the original proposal circulated by the publisher Routledge and one of the editors, Richard Jackson, suggested some uncertainty concerning the preferred title of the journal. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* appeared last on a list where the first choice was *Review of Terror Studies*. Evidently, the concision of a review fails to capture the critical perspective the journal promotes. Criticism, then, is central to the new journal's philosophy and the adjective connotes a distinct ideological and, as shall be seen, far from pluralist and inclusive purpose. So, one might ask, what exactly does a critical approach to terrorism involve?

What it Means to be Critical

The editors and contributors explore what it means to be “critical” in detail, repetition, and opacity, along with an excessive fondness for italics, in the editorial symposium that introduces the first issue, and in a number of subsequent articles. The editors inform us that the study of terrorism is “a growth industry,” observing with a mixture of envy and disapproval that “literally thousands of new books and articles on terrorism are published every year” (pp. l-2). In adding to this literature the editors premise the need for yet another journal on their resistance to what currently constitutes scholarship in the field of terrorism study and its allegedly uncritical acceptance of the Western democratic state's security perspective.

Indeed, to be critical requires a radical reversal of what the journal assumes to be the typical perception of terrorism and the methodology of terrorism research. To focus on the strategies practiced by non-state actors that feature under the conventional denotation “terror” is, for the critical theorist, misplaced. As the symposium explains, “acts of clandestine non-state terrorism are committed by a tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and a few thousand casualties *per year over the entire world*” (original italics) (p. 1). The United States's and its allies' preoccupation with terrorism is, therefore, out of proportion to its effects.1 At the same time, the more pervasive and repressive terror practiced by the state has been “silenced from public and … academic discourse” (p. 1).

The complicity of terrorism studies with the increasingly authoritarian demands of Western, liberal state and media practice, together with the moral and political blindness of established terrorism analysts to this relationship forms the journal's overriding assumption and one that its core contributors repeat ad nauseam. Thus, Michael Stohl, in his contribution “Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism” (pp. 5-16), not only discovers ten “myths” informing the understanding of terrorism, but also finds that these myths reflect a “state centric security focus,” where analysts rarely consider “the violence perpetrated by the state” (p. 5). He complains that the press have become too close to government over the matter. Somewhat contradictorily Stohl subsequently asserts that media reporting is “central to terrorism and counter-terrorism as political action,” that media reportage provides the oxygen of terrorism, and that politicians consider journalists to be “the terrorist's best friend” (p. 7).

Stohl further compounds this incoherence, claiming that “the media are far more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on … grievances or the social conditions that breed [terrorism]—to present episodic rather than thematic stories” (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968 and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The “media” is after all a very broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy theory. Moreover, even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by Stohl's own logic, terrorism as a method of political communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported.

Nevertheless, the notion that an inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position. Anthony Burke, in “The End of Terrorism Studies” (pp. 37-49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman “specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators” of terror. Consequently, the emergence of “critical terrorism studies” “may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed 'problem-solving' terrorism studies—at least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality” (p. 42).

Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in “Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror” (pp. 17-25), considers British government-induced media “scare-mongering” to have legitimated an “authoritarian approach” to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22-23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in “The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent Subjectivity” (pp. 27-36), find the War on Terror constitutes “*the* single,” all embracing paradigm of analysis where the critical voice is “not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself?” (original italics) (pp. 28-29). The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract “desire” that demands terror as “an ever-present threat” (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: “Terrorism experts and commentators” function as “realist policemen”; and not very smart ones at that, who while “gazing at the evidence” are “unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby *lack* turns to*excess*” (original italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken Booth, in “The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass” (pp. 65-79), reiterates Richard Jackson's contention that state terrorism “is a much more serious problem than non-state terrorism” (p. 76).

Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias: assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy *petitio principii*. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry.

Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved “state centricity” of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline. Jackson and his fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that “orthodox” analysts rarely bother “to interview or engage with those involved in 'terrorist' activity” (p. 2) or spend any time “on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict” (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of *Meibion Glyndwr* who would as a matter of principle avoid *pob sais* like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* first advertised the problem of “talking to terrorists” in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

A consequence of avoiding primary research, it is further alleged, leads conventional analysts uncritically to apply psychological and problem-solving approaches to their object of study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in traditional terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with “the particular dynamics of the political world” (p. 70). Analogously, Stohl claims that “the US and English [sic] media” exhibit a tendency to psychologize terrorist acts, which reduces “structural and political problems” into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with this problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts have lost the capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research ethics.

By contrast, the critical approach is not only self-reflective, but also and, for good measure, self-reflexive. In fact, the editors and a number of the journal's contributors use these terms interchangeably, treating a reflection and a reflex as synonyms (p. 2). A cursory encounter with the *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* would reveal that they are not. Despite this linguistically challenged misidentification, “reflexivity” is made to do a lot of work in the critical idiom. Reflexivity, the editors inform us, requires a capacity “to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings, is sensitive to the politics of labelling … is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation” (p. 2). This covers a range of not very obviously related but critically approved virtues. Let us examine what reflexivity involves as Stohl, Guelke, Zulaika and Douglass, Burke, and Booth explore, somewhat repetitively, its implications.

Reflexive or Defective?

Firstly, to challenge dominant knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably to a fixation with language, discourse, the ambiguity of the noun, terror, and its political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is “a politically loaded term” (p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror “the dominant tropic [sic] space in contemporary political and journalistic discourse” (p. 30). Faced with the “serious challenge” (Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism to bear on its use. Thus the editors proclaim that terrorism is “one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse.” There is, moreover, a “yawning gap between the 'terrorism' signifier and the actual acts signified” (p. 1). “[V]irtually all of this activity,” the editors pronounce *ex cathedra*, “refers to the *response* to acts of political violence not the violence itself” (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security.

In keeping with this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the “instability (and thoroughly politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: 'terror' and 'terrorism'” (p. 38). To address this he contends that a critical stance requires us to “keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis.” Indeed, “without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition of the object, our discourse will not be critical at all” (p. 38). More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused amalgam of Michel Foucault's identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School's critique of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich's favorite philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Burke “*questions the question*.” This intellectual *potpourri* apparently enables the critical theorist to “question the ontological status of a 'problem' before any attempt to map out, study or resolve it” (p. 38).

Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood deny that there might be objective data about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any prescriptive goodness or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might claim to consider only the complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of human beings to them, the critical theorist's radical questioning of language denies this possibility.

The critical approach to language and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary has been the source of much confusion and inconsequentiality in the practice of the social sciences. It dates from the relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to demonstrate that social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal democratic state. This radical assault on the possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and as a substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language.

The problem with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson demonstrated, to achieve a genuine study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, “if we concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two stools, and we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there.”2 Indeed, in so far as an account of the use of language spills over into ontology it is liable to be a confused mixture of what should be two distinct investigations: the study of the facts about which the language is used, and the study of the linguistic phenomena themselves.

It is precisely, however, this confused mixture of fact and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of terrorism and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this confused seed no coherent method grows.

What is To Be Done?

This ontological confusion notwithstanding, Ken Booth sees critical theory not only exposing the dubious links between power and knowledge in established terrorism studies, but also offering an ideological agenda that transforms the face of global politics. “[*C*]*ritical knowledge*,” Booth declares, “*involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality derive from particular social/historical conditions*” (original italics) (p. 78). Helpfully, Booth, assuming the manner of an Old Testament prophet, provides his critical disciples with “*big-picture* navigation aids” (original italics) (p. 66) to achieve this higher knowledge. Booth promulgates fifteen commandments (as Clemenceau remarked of Woodrow Wilson's nineteen points, in a somewhat different context, “God Almighty only gave us ten”). When not stating the staggeringly obvious, the Ken Commandments are hopelessly contradictory. Critical theorists thus should “avoid exceptionalizing the study of terrorism,”3 “recognize that states can be agents of terrorism,” and “keep the long term in sight.” Unexceptional advice to be sure and long recognized by more traditional students of terrorism. The critical student, if not fully conversant with critical doublethink, however, might find the fact that she or he lives within “Powerful theories” that are “constitutive of political, social, and economic life” (6th Commandment, p. 71), sits uneasily with Booth's concluding injunction to “stand outside” prevailing ideologies (p. 78).

In his preferred imperative idiom, Booth further contends that terrorism is best studied in the context of an “academic international relations” whose role “is not only to interpret the world but to change it” (pp. 67-68). Significantly, academic—or more precisely, critical—international relations, holds no place for a realist appreciation of the status quo but approves instead a Marxist ideology of praxis. It is within this transformative praxis that critical theory situates terrorism and terrorists.

The political goals of those non-state entities that choose to practice the tactics of terrorism invariably seek a similar transformative praxis and this leads “critical global theorizing” into a curiously confused empathy with the motives of those engaged in such acts, as well as a disturbing relativism. Thus, Booth again decrees that the gap between “those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to delegitimize the acts of terrorists and those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those who glorify it—is not as great as is implied or asserted by orthodox terrorism experts, the discourse of governments, or the popular press” (p. 66). The gap “between us/them is a slippery slope, not an unbridgeable political and ethical chasm” (p. 66). So, while “terrorist actions are always—without exception—wrong, they nevertheless might be contingently excusable” (p. 66). From this ultimately relativist perspective gang raping a defenseless woman, an act of terror on any critical or uncritical scale of evaluation, is, it would seem, wrong but potentially excusable.

On the basis of this worrying relativism a further Ken Commandment requires the abolition of the discourse of evil on the somewhat questionable grounds that evil releases agents from responsibility (pp. 74-75). This not only reveals a profound ignorance of theology, it also underestimates what Eric Voeglin identified as a central feature of the appeal of modern political religions from the Third Reich to Al Qaeda. As Voeglin observed in 1938, the Nazis represented an “attractive force.” To understand that force requires not the abolition of evil [so necessary to the relativist] but comprehending its attractiveness. Significantly, as Barry Cooper argues, “its attractiveness, [like that of al Qaeda] cannot fully be understood apart from its evilness.”4

The line of relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity but an inspissated moral confusion. This is paradoxical given that the editors make much in the journal's introductory symposium of their “responsible research ethics.” The paradox is resolved when one realizes that critical moralizing demands the “ethics of responsibility to the terrorist other.” For Ken Booth it involves, it appears, empathizing “with the ethic of responsibility” faced by those who, “in extremis” “have some explosives” (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a critically self-conscious normativism requires the analyst, not only to “critique” the “strategic languages” of the West, but also to “take in” the “side of the Other” or more particularly “engage” “with the highly developed forms of thinking” that provides groups like Al Qaeda “with legitimizing foundations and a world view of some profundity” (p. 44). This additionally demands a capacity not only to empathize with the “other,” but also to recognize that both Osama bin Laden in his *Messages to the West* and Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto *Milestones* not only offer “well observed” criticisms of Western decadence, but also “converges with elements of critical theory” (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both Islamist and critical theorists share an analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the international order these structures inhabit and have done much to shape.

Histrionically Speaking

Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, “is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it?” Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. “In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems.” I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This means, however, that “such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.”5 It is also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this constituting fact.

On the basis of this histrionic empathy with the “other,” critical theory concludes that democratic states “do not always abjure acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives … or to buttress order at home” (p. 73). Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: “If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively strong, it is hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak” (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly assert that terrorism is “always” a weapon of the weak (p. 33).

At the core of this critical, ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror: Western states use violence, therefore, Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are the greater terrorists.

In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth “*terror has multiple forms*” (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of “global capitalism” (p. 75). Only the *engagee* intellectual academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic state's prosecution of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the “manipulation of the politics of fear” (p. 75).

Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution that creates security as the basis for development whether in London or Kabul. Instead, Booth, Burke, and the editors contend that the only solution to “the world-historical crisis that is facing human society globally” (p. 76) is universal human “emancipation.” This, according to Burke, is “the normative end” that critical theory pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living conditions, and “the political taming of unbounded capitalism,” but also in “the telos of mutual understanding.” Only through this telos with its “strong normative bias towards non violence” (p. 43) can a universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish “a secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values” (p. 46).

In the end, un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise of *soi-disant* cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes the “human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the cosmos and each other” (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya.

In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy, Booth further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision.

Overall, the journal's fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western politicians and the Western media.6

It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist “chooses them to mean—neither more nor less.” However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study. Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to “other” minority communities and create a politics of fear.

Critical Studies and Strategic Theory—A Missed Opportunity

Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with what one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial assessments that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point readily conceded by John Horgan and Michael Boyle who put “A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'” (pp. 51-74). Although they do not seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent in the critical approach, their contribution to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a well-organized and well-supported argument. The authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in some terrorism research shows that critical self-reflection is already present in existing terrorism studies. It is ironic, in fact, that the most clearly reflective, original, and *critical* contribution in the first edition should come from established terrorism researchers who critique the critical position.

Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and critical terrorism studies is that both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and solutions. Burke makes this explicit: “The inauguration of this journal,” he declares, “indeed suggests broad agreement that there is a phenomenon called terrorism” (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism. For a strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract noun. More precisely, it is merely a tactic—the creation of fear for political ends—that can be employed by any social actor, be it state or non-state, in any context, without any necessary moral value being involved.

Ironically, then, strategic theory offers a far more “critical perspective on terrorism” than do the perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example, propounds a curiously orthodox standpoint when he asserts: “to describe an act as one of terrorism, without the qualification of quotation marks to indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to condemn it as absolutely illegitimate” (p. 19). If you are a strategic theorist this is an invalid claim. Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any moral judgment on the act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category mistake. In strategic theory, which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote “absolutely illegitimate violence.”

Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a conscious human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does “appear to be a consensus” that terrorism is a “form of instrumental political violence” (p. 38). The problem for the contributors to this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very orthodox assumption that the word terrorism is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary connotation of moral condemnation. “Is terrorism a form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion, atrocity, or great political crime,” Burke asks rhetorically. But once more he misses the point. All violence is instrumental. Grading it according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity is irrelevant. Any strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's further claim that existing definitions of terrorism have “specifically excluded states as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets,” is wholly inaccurate (p. 38). Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for that matter, as Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism.

Yet, Burke offers—as a critical revelation—that “the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist.” He continues: “My point is not to remind us that states practise terror, but to show how mainstream *strategic doctrines* are terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of achieving the normative consensus if such terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated” (original italics) (p. 41). This is not merely confused, it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next generation of graduates from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes that actions on the part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of Germany in World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in nature.7 The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism can be eliminated is illogical: you can never eliminate an abstract noun.

Consequently, those interested in a truly “critical” approach to the subject should perhaps turn to strategic theory for some relief from the strictures that have traditionally governed the study of terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who only replicate the flawed understandings of those whom they criticize. Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful article by claiming that critical terrorism studies has more in common with traditional terrorism research than critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin.

Conclusion

In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be discursively engaged.

At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and “human emancipation.” Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama *Boston Legal* Judge Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant, jargon-ridden statements of lawyers as “jibber jabber.” The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* are its natural home.

#### Their criticism is based on a poorly researched caricature of terrorism studies, orthodox analysis includes a self-reflexive element that makes the permutation more likely to succeed than the alternative. Pure rejection of the Western social order won’t replace terrorism discourse and is likely to reinforce the totalitarian impulse of al Qaeda

Schmid, 9 - Chair in International Relations; the Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University(Alex, Perspectives on Terrorism, v.3, issue 4, Book Review of “Critical Terrorism Studies. A new research agenda. by Richard Jackson”, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com\_rokzine&view=article&id=96

The editors accuse, in their introduction  “the orthodox field” of orthodox terrorism studies of functioning “ideologically in the service of existing power structures”, with their academic research. Furthermore, they claim that orthodox scholars are frequently being used “to legitimise coercive intervention in the global South….” (p.6). The present volume is edited by three authors associated with the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth (Wales, UK). They also happen to be editors of a new Routledge journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism’ . The “critical” refers principally but not exclusively to the “Frankfurt-via-Welsh School Critical Theory Perspective”. The twelve contributors are not all equally “critical” in aHabermasian sense. The programmatic introduction of the editors is followed by two solid chapters from Magnus Ranstorp (former Director of CSTPV, St. Andrews, and currently Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) and Andrew Silke (formerly with the UK Home Office and now Field Leader for Criminology at the University of East London). They both rightfully criticize some of the past sins and present shortcomings of the field of Terrorism Studies. One of them approvingly quotes Marc Sageman who observed that “disagreements among experts are the driving force of the scientific enterprise”. Such disagreements, however, exist among “orthodox” scholars like Sageman and  Hoffman or Pape and Abrams. In that sense, the claim by some critical theorists that the field of traditional Terrorism Studies is ossified without them, is simply is not true. One of the problems with many of the adherents of the “critical” school is that the focus is almost exclusively on the strawman they set up to shoot - ”orthodox” terrorism discourse rather than on the practitioners of terrorism. Richard Jackson claims that “…most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable” (p.74), dismissing thereby almost four decades of scholarship as “based on a series of ‘virulent myths’, ‘half-truths’ and contested claims…biased towards Western state priorities” (p.80). For him “terrorism is…a social fact rather than a brute fact” and “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field” (pp.75-76). He objects to prevailing “problem-solving theories of terrorism” in favour of an approach that questions “ the status quo and the dominant acts within it” (p.77). Another contributor, J.A. Sluka, argues, without offering any proof,  that “terrorism is fundamentally a product of social inequality and state politics” (p. 139). Behind many of the critical theorists who blame mainstream terrorism research for taking ‘the world as it finds it’ there is an agenda for changing the status quo and overthrowing existing power structures. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with wanting a new and better world order. However, it is not going to be achieved by using an alternative discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Toros and Gunning, contributors of another chapter, state that “the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation” (p. 99) and M. McDonald als puts “emancipation as central to the study of terrorism” (p.121). However, there is not a single word on the non-emancipated position of women under Islam in general or among the Taliban and their friends from al-Qaeda in particular. One of the strength (some argue weakness) of Western thinking is its ability for self-criticism – something largely absent in the Muslim world. In that sense, this volume falls within a Western tradition. However, self-criticism should not come at the cost of not criticising   adversaries by using the same yardstick. In this sense, this volume is strangely silent about the worldview of those terrorists who have no self-doubts and attack the Red Cross,  the United Nations, NGOs and their fellow Muslims with equal lack of scruples. A number of authors in the volume appear to equate terrorism uncritically with political violence in general while in fact it is more usefully thought of as one of some twenty sub-categories of  political violence - one characterized by deliberate attacks on civilians and non-combatants in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise manipulate  various audiences and parties to a conflict. Part of the volume advocates reinventing the wheel. J. Gunning, for instance, recommends to employ Social Movement Theory for the study of terrorism. However, that theory has been employed already explicitly or implicitly by a number of more orthodox scholars, e.g. Donatella della Porta. Many “critical” statements in the volume are unsupported by convincing evidence, e.g. when C. Sylvester and S. Parashar state “The September 11 attacks and the ongoing war on terror reinforce gender hierarchy and power in international relations” (p.190). Jackson claims that the key question  for critical terrorism theory is “who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?” (p.224) It does not seem to occur to him that he could have studied this question by looking at the practitioners of terrorism and study al-Qaeda’s ideological writings and its training  and  recruiting manuals. If CTS is a call for “making a commitment to emancipatory praxis central to the research enterprise” (R. Jackson et al, p. 228), CTS academics should be the first on the barricades against jihadists who treat women not as equals and who would, if they get their way, eradicate freedom of thought and religion for all mankind. It is sad that some leading proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies appear to be in fact uncritical and blind on one eye.

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

Boyle, 08 – Michael J. Boyle, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problem-solving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own searching critiques of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism implied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and Jongman (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they point out that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the failure to address persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, Silke's (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.

### 2AC K

#### Role of the ballot is to evaluate effects of the plan- other interps arbitrarily exclude 9 min of aff offense- judge should choose justifications that best test plan desirability- debate dialectic sufficient filter for knowledge production and epistemology- prefer specific warrants over vague buzzwords- existence is a prerequisite to value

#### Perms

#### Pragmatic policy-focused approach is critical to productive change---K’s abstractions fail

William J. Novak 8, Associate Professor of History at the University of Chicago and Research Professor at the American Bar Foundation, “The Myth of the “Weak” American State”, June, http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/labor/speakers/documents/TheMythoftheWeakAmericanState.pdf

There is an alternative. In the early twentieth century, amid a first wave of nation- state and economic consolidation and assertiveness, American social science generated some fresh ways of looking at power in all its guises—social, economic, political, and legal. Overshadowed to some extent by exuberant bursts of American exceptionalism that greeted confrontations with totalitarianism and then terrorism, the pragmatic, critical, and realistic appraisal of American power is worth recovering. From Lester Frank Ward and John Dewey to Ernst Freund and John Commons to Morris Cohen and Robert Lee Hale, early American socioeconomic theorists developed a critique of a thin, private, and individualistic conception of American liberalism and interrogated the location, organization, and distribution of power in a modernizing United States. All understood the problem of power in America as complex and multifaceted, not simple or one-dimensional, especially as it concerned the relationship of state and civil society. Rather than spend endless time debating the proper definition of law or the correct empirical measure of the state, they concentrated instead on detailed investigations of power in action in the everyday practices and policies that constituted American public life. Rather than confine the examination of power to the abstract realm of political theory or the official political acts of elites, electorates, interest groups, or social movements, these analysts instead embraced a more capacious conception of governance as “an activity which is apt to appear whenever men are associated together.”35 More significantly, these political and legal realists never forgot, amid the rhetoric of law and the pious platitudes that routinely flow from American political life, the very real, concrete consequences of the deployment of legal and political power. They never forgot the brutal fact that Robert Cover would later state so provocatively at the start of his article “Violence and the Word” that legal and political interpretation take place “in a field of pain and death.” 36 The real consequences of American state power are all around us. In a democratic republic, where force should always be on the side of the governed, writing the history of that power has never been more urgent.

#### Can’t change the approach to violence--- realist ontology is inevitable

Guzzini 1998 Stefano Guzzini, Assis. Prof @ Central European U, Realism in Int’l Relations, 1998, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

#### Nationalist identification and competition is inevitable

Göksel 2012 (Dr Nilüfer Karacasulu Göksel is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Business, Department of International Relations, Dokuz Eylul University, Buca, Izmir, “Globalisation and the State,” http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/1.-NiluferKaracasuluGoksel.pdf)

As a final word, I believe that in the post Cold War world, national ¶ interests still matter a great deal. Each state takes pride in its unique history¶ and accomplishments. Each state’s people continue to speak their own ¶ language and to fly their own flag. Considering the document, “the national ¶ security strategy of the United States of America” presented in September ¶ 2002, it seems that the US intends to act as a hegemonic power. The most ¶ recent example of this hegemonic power has been observed in Iraq since the ¶ US led military intervention in 2003. Furthermore, the EU has not reacted as a ¶ collective regional voice on this issue but rather as individual states. While ¶ Germany, France and Belgium protested US policy in Iraq, England ¶ supported it. Thus, in the European Union, as in the world, nationalism¶ remains as an important force in the era of globalisation. The world is still, in ¶ territorial terms, made up of separate states, each of which enjoys certain ¶ basic sovereign rights. Each state still has its own interests to advance and defend.

#### Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### We control uniqueness – wars are declining now – your theoretical impacts don’t match reality

Marshall and Cole 2009 Monty G. Marshall (Research Professor in the George Mason University School of Public Policy and Director of Research at the Center for Global Policy) and Benjamin R Cole (Hood House Lecturer in International Affairs at the University of New Hampshire, He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political Science from the University of New Hampshire and is completing his doctoral studies in the School of Public Policy at George Mason University) 2009 “Global Report 2009 Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility” pg 7-8, http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf

The most encompassing observation that can be made regarding global system performance in regard to the conflict dimension concerns the status of major episodes of political violence (armed conflict). These include societal (civil, ethnic, and communal) and interstate (including independence) warfare.3 The global trend in major armed conflict has continued its dramatic decline during the globalization era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in total magnitude (figure 3). According to our calculations, the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2009 to its lowest level since 1960. Societal warfare has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. This steep, linear increase in societal warfare is largely explained by a general tendency toward longer, more protracted, wars during that period; internal wars often receiving crucial military and/or material support from foreign states, in many cases linked to the competing superpowers. In contrast, the rate of onset of new societal wars has remained constant since 1946 to the present with an average of about four new societal wars per year. In contrast, the global trend in interstate warfare has remained at a relatively low level since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UN). The UN was specially designed to “maintain international peace and security” without “interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Although there was a moderate increase in interstate wars during the latter years of the Cold War, from 1977 to 1987, like civil warfare, interstate warfare has also declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Of the interstate wars that took place during the Cold War period, many of the most serious were wars of independence fought during the decolonization phase that occurred during the first half of the Cold War period. Of the conventional interstate wars, onsets occurred at the rate of about one event per year, although onsets occurred at about double that rate during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Of sixty seven such wars, three-quarters remained at fairly low levels of violence.

#### Ontology doesn’t come first or indict our scholarship

Owen 2002 (David Owen, reader of political theory at the University of Southampton, Millennium, Volume 31, Number 3, pg. 655-657)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Humans will inevitably will meaning to their own lives the only thing that deprives them of that is death which only the affirmative avoids. Declaring that all life doesn’t have value is just as managing over life as the affirmative. Only the plan give the most people a chance to decide their won value to life – we are a prerequisite

Lisa **Schwartz 2002** Medical Ethics, http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decision- making is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determi- nation to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant informa- tion about their future, and comparative con- sideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves. It is important to remember the subjectivity assertion in this context, so as to empha- size that the judgement made about the value of a life ought to be made only by the person concerned and not by others.

#### Tech thought inevitable

Riis 2011 (Søren Riis, Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, February 8, 2011, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,” EBSCO)

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, ‘‘nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings. That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, humans first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell. Trying to understand the various more-or-less explicit accounts of the origin of the rule of das Gestell in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and the resulting ambiguity is not just an exercise, nor only a way to criticize Heidegger. Rather, it is a way to better understand the nuances and layers in Heidegger’s thinking concerning technology and to warn against a short-sighted ‘‘saving’’ from an alleged danger. If the challenging revealing of nature, which characterizes the rule of das Gestell is taken seriously, then we cannot avoid it just by revolutionizing our technology, instead, we must revise our very human existence.

#### Management solves extinction

Levy 1999 (Dr Neil Levy, fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University, 1999“Discourses of the Environment” p. 215)

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formiulated by ecologists, environmentalist, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whone we share this planet, will be decided.